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Abstract
The health consequences of smoking are serious and have been fre-
quently detailed. A reduction in tobacco-related mortality hinges upon
the ability to reduce tobacco usage. There is overwhelming evidence that
higher cigarette prices reduce cigarettes demand, but little is known about
the combined e¤ect of price and non-price policies. This paper extends
the analysis of price elasticities by estimating the e¤ect of changes in price
and non-price legislations in South Africa. Annual time-series data from
1961 to 2016 are used, with a policy index constructed to capture the
instances of non-price tobacco legislation. The combined impact is esti-
mated using a vector error correction model and a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) model. The long-run own-price elasticities lie between -0.55 and
-0.72, while the income elasticities lie between 0.39 and 0.49. The coef-
cients of the changing tobacco policies and changing market structure
show that they contribute to a modest reduction in cigarette consump-
tion. The short-run deviations from the steady state are presented using
the error correction term. Cigarette demand is responsive to prices and
non-pricing policies but failure to control for non-pricing policies over-
states the price e¤ect. This suggests that both prices and non-pricing
legislation are e¤ective in reducing cigarette consumption.
1 INTRODUCTION
Smoking is known to have serious and well-documented health consequences.
As a result of the elevated risk of smoking-related diseases, someone who took
up smoking early in life can be expected to die about 6 years earlier than a
comparable non-smoker.1 According to Statistics South Africa (2017), tobacco
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use accounts for over 170,0001 deaths annually, an increase from 44,000.2 The
ability to reduce the number of tobacco-related deaths, therefore, depends upon
the ability to reduce tobacco consumption. Tobacco taxes and a number of
tobacco-control policies have been implemented around the world with the ob-
jective of increasing the cost of purchasing tobacco products, thereby reducing
consumption.
Many studies on the relationship between cigarette prices and cigarette con-
sumption have shown that increased cigarette prices are one of most e¤ective
tobacco-control strategies.2 On the other hand, relatively little attention has
been given to the e¤ect of non-pricing tobacco legislation. The literature on
the elasticity of demand for cigarette can be classied into two strands. The
rst strand, quite sizable, completely ignores the role of non-pricing policies
when estimating the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes.2 Another strand
of literature controls for the e¤ect of other tobacco legislations.3 We argue in
this paper for the need for a simultaneous evaluation of pricing and non-pricing
tobacco-control policies in order to reduce the bias associated with the price
elasticity of demand for cigarettes. Without this, this price elasticity will be
overstated.
The few studies that have considered the role of non-pricing policies sim-
ply introduced a dummy variable into the cigarette demand function.4−6 The
introduction of a dummy variable may not adequately address this problem,
especially for economies that frequently amend their tobacco control legislation.
Joossens and Raw provided weights for the di¤erent tobacco control policies
which can be used for constructing a tobacco-control policy index.7;8 This mea-
sure is particularly important when estimating the e¤ect of non-pricing laws for
a country that has systematically amended its tobacco-control legislation. To
date, very few published studies have used a comprehensive measure of other
pieces of legislation when estimating the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes.
The purpose of this paper is to address this evidence gap in the context of South
Africa, a developing country that has passed a number of tobacco-control laws
in order to signicantly reduce the level of adult cigarette consumption.
Compared to many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), South Africa
is noted for the use of heavy excise taxes and other tobacco-control policies
aimed at reducing cigarette consumption per adult by almost half within 15
years.9;10 For example, adult smoking prevalence decreased from a third of the
adult population to about a fth between 1994 and 2012.11 While this decline is
attributed mainly to the increase in excise taxes, the inuence of numerous non-
pricing policies, including banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship, as well
as banning smoking in public and work places, cannot be ignored. In addition,
smoking prevalence is still signicantly high among adults.12 Recent evidence
from individual-level panel data indicates that the conditional price elasticity
of demand for cigarettes in South Africa decreased from -0.305 to -0.303 after
controlling for non-pricing policies.12 However, this study, like previous studies
1Stats SA (Statistics South Africa). 2017. Mortality and Causes of Death from Death
Notication 2015. Statistical Release P0309.3, Stats SA, Pretoria.
2Cancer Society of South Africa, 2013. Fact Sheet on Tobacco Products.
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in South Africa.5; 6 used a dummy to capture the e¤ect of non-pricing poli-
cies. The current study di¤ers from these studies in that it considers a more
comprehensive measure of non-pricing policies.
In South Africa, tobacco taxes constituted 30% of the price of tobacco prod-
ucts in 1992 and are regarded as the intervention that has contributed most to
the signicant decline in tobacco consumption. Since 1994, South Africa has
consistently and aggressively increased the excise tax on cigarettes to meet and
maintain the total tax burden (inclusive of value added tax) of 50% of the aver-
age retail price.10 This target was achieved in 1997, and revised upward to 52%
in 2004. The high excise taxes increased real cigarette prices by 115% between
1993 and 2003.5 and by 190% between 2004 to 2012.10 As shown in Figure 1, the
decline in cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence from about a third to
less than a fth between 1994 and 2012 is partly attributed to the substantial in-
crease in real cigarette prices.11; 13 In addition to excise taxes, South Africa has
implemented a number of comprehensive tobacco-control policies in the Tobacco
Product Control Act (TPCA) of 1993, including; health warnings on cigarette
packs and advertising material. This legislation was amended in 1999, 2007 and
2008 to include a ban on tobacco advertising, sponsorship, smoking in public
and in workplaces and the sale of tobacco to minors.5;10
A number of empirical studies have analyzed the relationship between real
cigarette prices and the demand for cigarettes in South Africa, without taking
into account the combined e¤ects of non-pricing tobacco control legislation.6; 11; 14−19
This is largely because the implementation of the non-price policies occurs in dif-
ferent years across the decades. The present study will address the evidence gap
by estimating the combined impact on consumption of price changes, changes in
legislation, and changing market structure. We show that ignoring anti-smoking
legislation overstates the price e¤ects but understates the income e¤ects both
in the long term and the short term. Our results contribute to the literature
on the e¤ect of tobacco-control policies on cigarette consumption. A better un-
derstanding of this relationship can help inform the discussion on appropriate
policies that will further reduce tobacco use. The study employs the economet-
ric techniques of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP)
unit root tests, the Johansen cointegration test, the vector error orrection model
(VECM) and a two stage least square (2SLS) estimation in the analysis.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 The Theoretical Model
This paper uses the demand model to estimate the e¤ect of price and non-price
tobacco control legislation on cigarette consumption in South Africa from 1961
to 2016. There is a well-established relationship between price and income and
cigarette consumption. According to15; 20; 21, the demand function for cigarettes
is expressed as follows:
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Qt = f(Pt, Yt, At, Dt) (1)
Where Qt is the per capita cigarette consumption in period t, Pt is the real
price of cigarettes adjusted for ination (2016=100 in this case), Yt is the real
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), At is the index of the non-price
tobacco control policies, and Dt is the dummy variable for the change in market
structure that occurred in 2010. The short-run and long-run analyses in this
study are based on the demand function given above.
2.2 Data sources
The analysis uses annual time-series data for the period 1961 to 2016. The data
are extracted from Statistics South Africa (StatSA) and South African Reserve
Bank (SARB) reports. The dependent variable is annual adult per-capita ciga-
rette consumption. This is calculated by dividing the aggregate consumption by
the size of the adult population (15 years and above). The relationship between
aggregate cigarette consumption and real cigarette prices in South Africa is pre-
sented in Figure 1. This gure shows substantial increases in the real price of
cigarettes since 1994 as a result of the implementation of an aggressive excise tax
policy. In contrast to the period before 1994, when real prices were falling, the
average real price per pack increased by 190% between 1994 and 2012 and has
remain almost constant afterwards. Cigarette consumption increased during the
period 1961-1993, started falling moderately, then its fall accelerated from 1995
through 2000. The decrease can be attributed to the policies, adopted by the
democratically elected government in 1994, that reduced smoking prevalence.
The decrease in smoking prevalence is also attributed to the excise tax incre-
ment of 25% in 1994, 25% in 1995 and 18% in 1996.22 In 1997, the government
announced a 52% increase in the excise tax on cigarettes, which was expected
to bring the total tax burden to 50% of the average retail selling price.5; 10 The
total tax burden was revised to 52% of the average selling price in 2004.23
The independent variables include real prices (adjusted for ination by di-
viding the nominal prices by the consumer price index, using 2016 as the base
year), real per capita GDP, a policy index, and a dummy for the changing market
structure. Real per capita GDP is measured as the ratio between the real GDP
(published by SARB) and the adult population. To measure the importance of
the tobacco-control policies for reducing tobacco consumption, a tobacco pol-
icy index is constructed for the period 1961-2016. The index is constructed for
policies other than cigarette taxes. Cigarette taxes are embedded in cigarettes
prices and the individual e¤ect of prices on consumption can be netted out in
the demand model. The process of constructing the policy index follows a new
tobacco-control scale (TCS) approach that measures the di¤erent non-pricing
policies of countries.7; 8 The TCS, which quanties the implementation of to-
bacco control policies at country level, is based on six policies described by the
World Bank.24
The six policies are: (1) price increases through higher taxes on cigarettes
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and other tobacco products; (2) bans/restrictions on smoking in public and
work places; (3) better consumer information, including public information cam-
paigns, media coverage, and publicizing research ndings; (4) comprehensive
bans on the advertising and promotion of all tobacco products, logos and brand
names; (5) large, direct health warning labels on cigarette packages and other
tobacco products; and (6) treatment to help dependent smokers quit, includ-
ing increased access to medications. In South Africa, the introduction of these
policies started in the 1990s, allowing us to score them into a policy index us-
ing the TCS.8 For the current study only ve policies are scored in the index,
which excludes cigarette taxes (Table 1). The complete table of the policies is
in appendix 7 (see supplementary material).
A dummy variable is used to capture the change in market structure that
occurred in 2010. The variable is coded 0 for periods before 2010 and 1 other-
wise. Before 2010, British American Tobaccos (BAT) main competitors were
multinationals and other subsidiaries such as Philip Morris South Africa, Japan
Tobacco International and Imperial Tobacco, but BAT was the unchallenged
price leader. From 2010, there was a substantial change in the cigarette market
structure in South Africa. The high prots earned by BAT and other multi-
nationals attracted many small cigarette manufacturers and distributors, such
as Gold Leaf Tobacco Company, Folha Manufacturers, and Savanna Tobacco
Company SA among others, who undermined the established rms by selling at
lower prices. During this period, there was also a substantial increase in illicit
trade.11; 25
The stationarity of the time series was tested using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests.26; 27 The data were con-
verted into logarithms in order to reduce their variability. Based on the ADF
and PP tests, the hypothesis that the log of per capita consumption, the log of
real prices and the log of real per capita GDP contain a unit root cannot be
rejected at a 5% signicance level. However, we fail to reject the assumption
of stationarity after rst di¤erencing these variables. The critical values for the
ADF and PP tests at rst di¤erence at 5% are -3.497 and -3.496 respectively.
Compared to the test-statistic values, the variables are stationary at rst di¤er-
ences (see Figures 3 and 4; Appendix 2), and thus, standard statistical inference
is validated.28 This suggests that a cointegration approach can be used to test
for the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables.
2.3 Cointegration and long-run equilibrium estimations
Before estimating the co-integrating vector, the appropriate lag length to be
used in the estimations of the cointegration test and in the vector error cor-
rection model (VECM) was determined using the vector auto-regression (VAR)
test. The lag length is selected if the majority of the selection criteria favor a
particular lag.28 The appropriate lag length used in the cointegration test and
VECM model is presented in Appendix 3. The results show that the major-
ity of the selection criteria, such as Akaikes information criterion (AIC), the
Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQIC), and the Schwartz-Bayesian Infor-
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mation Criteria (SBIC), select the optimum lag length of 1 (see Appendix 3 in
Supplementary material).
Cointegration was then tested using the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue
tests.29 which use a maximum likelihood procedure that jointly estimates the
number of cointegration vectors to determine the existence of a long-run re-
lationship between the variables. The results, presented in Appendix 4, show
that there is one cointegrating vector among the variables. This signies the
existence of a long-run relationship among the variables that can be combined
with the short-run dynamics using a Vector Error Correction Model.21;30
The long-run equilibrium model uses a double-logarithmic demand equation
which gives a straightforward interpretation to the coe¢cients (elasticities). A
conventional econometric model for estimating the demand for cigarettes is spec-
ied as follows:
InQt = α0 + α1InPt + α2InYt + α3At + α4Dt + t (2)
The variables Qt, Pt, Yt, At and Dt have already been dened earlier. αi is the
constant term where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and t the random error term. The vector
error correction model (VECM) used to determine the long run relationship is
as specied in:.31
dLnQt = β0 + β1
j−1X
i=1
dLnQt−i + β2
j−1X
i=1
dLnPt−1 + β3
j−1X
i=1
dLnYt−1 (3)
+β
4
At + β5Dt + λiECTt−1 + t
Where j − 1 is the lag length which is reduced by 1 since 1 lag is lost from
di¤erencing a VAR, d is the di¤erence operator, βi represents the short-run
dynamic coe¢cients of the models adjustment to long-run equilibrium, λi is
the speed of the adjustment parameter and ECTt−1 is the error correction
term which is the lagged value of the residuals obtained from the cointegrating
regression of the dependent variable on the regressors. t is the stochastic error.
One concern that is often raised in the context of the estimation-of-demand
equation is that cigarette prices are endogenous owing to the simultaneity of
cigarette consumption and prices (Deaton, 1997). The market clearance price
could be determined by the interaction between the demand and supply sides
of the market and the estimates of price elasticity biased if the problem of en-
dogeneity is ignored.4; 32 This study employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
approach to address the potential endogeneity of cigarette prices. Excise taxes
and lag of prices are the commonly used instruments for determining real ciga-
rette prices.33 The justication is that these two instruments serve the same
purpose as price variable in a¤ecting consumption behaviour, but are entirely
independent of the individuals smoking decision.32 Moreover, the e¤ectiveness
of excise tax increases as a tool for reducing tobacco consumption depends
largely on how the tax increases impact the retail price.11; 33
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3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The VECM was estimated at lag length of 1 with 1 cointegrating vector, and the
results are summarized in Table 2. The demand equation for annual cigarette
consumption obtained from the VECM and 2SLS estimations is reported in Ta-
bles 2. Table 3 presents the rst stage estimates of the 2SLS method. Appendix
6 shows estimated results of the demand equation using specic dummies for the
existing legislative acts in South Africa. The relevant legislation is the Tobacco
Product Control Act, no 83 in 1993, that was amended in 1999, 2007 and 2008.
The VECM uses stationary data at rst di¤erences and includes the lagged
residuals of the long-run relationship as an explanatory variable. Coe¢cients
from ECM represent the relationship in the short run, and the coe¢cient of the
lagged residuals measures the speed of convergence to the long-run equilibrium.
The error correction term is the speed of adjustment in the direction of long-
term equilibrium after any deviation from the steady state. The error correction
terms in Table 2 have the correct sign and are signicant. This indicates that
per capita cigarette demand converges to steady state equilibrium at the speed
of 15% in the restricted model (see column 1) and 26% in the unrestricted model
(see column 2).
The estimated short-run dynamic coe¢cients of the real price and per capita
income on per capita cigarette consumption are respectively -0.263 and 0.226
for the restricted model and -0.352 and 0.283 for the unrestricted model. The
long-run price and income elasticities were estimated to be -0.722 and 0.394
for the restricted model and -0.548 and 0.487 for the unrestricted model. The
results suggest that price increases are an e¤ective anti-smoking policy. A 10%
increase in cigarette prices reduces per capita cigarette consumption by 5% to
7% in the long run. The positive and signicant e¤ect of income on cigarette
consumption indicates that an increase in the income of smokers will result in
higher levels of cigarette consumption, but to a lesser degree than the reduction
caused by price increases.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity of regressors is used to test for
the orthogonality of the unobserved disturbances in the demand equation. The
test statistics in Table 2 suggest that cigarette prices are endogenous. Estimates
of the rst stage regression suggest that taxes and the lag of prices are valid
instruments for cigarette prices. The strength of the instruments is tested using
the robust F statistics (greater than 10). This shows that the variables tax and
lagged prices are strong predictors of cigarette prices. The 2SLS estimates show
that a 10% increase in the price of cigarettes reduces cigarette consumption by
5.2% when cigarette excise taxes are used and 5.9% when the lag of prices is
used. According to Chaloupka et al. (2000), the estimates of the price elasticity
of demand for cigarettes in low-and-middle income countries are between -0.5
and -1.0 and between -0.25 and -0.5 for high-income countries. The present
estimate is in this range and lies between -0.52 and -0.57. The e¤ect of income
is reduced to 0.12 after controlling for endogeneity but remains signicant (see
Table 2 for 2SLS estimates).
It should be noted that the impacts of price and income presented here
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are lower than those of Bosho¤,6 estimated over the period from 1996 to 2000.
The di¤erences in estimated value are most probably due to the di¤erences in
datasets and methodologies employed. Bosho¤s paper uses a quarterly dataset
(which includes only wholesale cigarettes) obtained from a prominent South
African manufacturer while the present study uses annual retail sales data to
estimate elasticities. Bosho¤ employs the unrestricted vector auto-regression
(VAR) which treats all variables as endogenous. This approach models each
dependent variable as a function of its past values and the past values of other
variables included in the model.
The policy index has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect in the long
run and for the 2SLS estimation. This suggests that introducing non-pricing
tobacco-control legislation tobacco use will e¤ectively and signicantly reduce
cigarette demand in the long run. This is because, in the long run, smokers
become aware of the regulations as they are implemented and enforced. The
dummy for the change in market structure is negative and signicant in the long
run. Even though the change in market structure in 2010 (from near monopoly
to a more competitive market) led to lower prices being o¤ered by new entrants
in the market, the negative and signicant coe¢cient indicates the percentage
of the formal cigarette market (o¢cial cigarette consumption) that was lost to
illicit trade post-2010.
The estimated results in Table 2 satisfy the VECM diagnostic tests, namely,
absence of serial correlation (Lagrange Multiplier test), normality of errors
(Jarque-Bera test) for the restricted model, and stability with 4 unit moduli.
Stability of the VECM is conrmed using the graphs of the roots characteristics
in Figure 2.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper provides the combined e¤ect of price and non-price policies on ciga-
rette consumption in South Africa, a country that has a track record of e¤ec-
tive tobacco control policies, yet still experiences an increase in the burden of
smoking-related disabilities. Cointegration techniques, vector error correction
models (VECM), and data for the period 1961 to 2016 were used to investigate
these relationships. The VECM post-estimation tests show that the model was
stable, that there was no autocorrelation, and that the errors were normally
distributed
The ndings are in line with the theoretical expectations, that is, demand
is a negative function of price and a positive function of income. The ndings
show that long-run cigarette price e¤ects exceed short-run e¤ects. The short-run
price elasticity estimates range from -0.26 to -0.35, while the long-run estimates
range from -0.55 to -0.72. This suggests that a 10% increase in cigarette price
would lead to a 3% to 4% decrease in cigarette consumption in the short run and
a 6% to 7% decrease in the long run. Thus, a given percentage increase in the
price of cigarettes will lead to a less than proportionate decrease in cigarette
consumption. The estimated coe¢cient of the policy index (-0.16) is highly
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signicant in the long run, which suggests that the implementation of non-price
tobacco control policies in South Africa reduces total cigarette consumption.
The coe¢cient of the changing of the market structure from near monopoly to
a more competitive market is negative, indicating a reduction in o¢cial cigarette
consumption.
The results of this study show that the implementation and enforcement of
anti-smoking policies would potentially reduce cigarette smoking, consequently
resulting in an improvement in public health. More than simply price increases
is required to reduce cigarette consumption continuously in South Africa. As
governments commit to raising cigarette taxes as a way of reducing cigarette
consumption, other non-price legislation should not be ignored.
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Table 1: The Tobacco Control Policies and Index in South Africa 
 
Year The Tobacco Control Policies in South Africa from 1990 Scale 
Cum. 
index 
1980s Smoking prevalence peaked in the 1980s  0 0 
1998/99 
Medical Research Council (MRC) publishes a paper showing that for 
every R1 of revenue, smoking costs government R5. 
 0 0 
1990/91 
The Minister of Health (MoH) is pushed into action and starts preparing 
the Tobacco Product Control (TPC) Bill  0 0 
1992 Taxes make up 30% of tobacco product prices.  0 0 
1993 
The MoH introduces the TPC Act of 1993, mandating that health 
warnings be added to cigarette packs and advertising material, and 
prohibiting smoking on public transport.  3 3 
1994 
The Minister of Finance (MoF) announced an increase in excise tax 
burden on cigarettes to 50%  of the retail price over the number of years   0 3 
1997 
To dissuade smokers, government raises taxes on tobacco products to 
50% of cigarette the retail prices.  0 3 
1999 
An amendment to the Tobacco Products Control Act bans tobacco 
advertising, the sale of tobacco to minors (age limit raised from 16 to 
18 years) and increases regulations around smoking in public places, 
including the workplace.  The MoH is awarded the WHO Tobacco Free 
World Award.   11 14 
2001 
The law banning public smoking comes into effect. Smokers may only 
smoke outside and in cordoned off indoor areas. But restaurants can have 
smoking designated areas of up to 25% of the total area. Total ban on 
tobacco advertisement (enforced) 10 24 
2004 Excise tax on tobacco products are raised to 52% of retail prices.  0 24 
2005 
6RXWK $IULFD UDWLILHV WKH :+2¶V Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC), which gives governments a framework for quickly 
passing and implementing evidence-based tobacco control laws.  0 24 
2008 
$QDPHQGPHQWWRWKH73&$FWDOLJQVWKHFRXQWU\¶VSROLFLHVZLWK)&7&
guidelines by, for instance, raising the legal smoking age to 18 years, 
restricting tobacco sponsorship and promotion and mandating more 
extensive health warnings at points of sale.  2 26 
2012 
Draft regulations that would ban smoking in public places and certain 
outdoor public places, such as beaches and outdoor eating areas, are 
gazetted, but have not been passed into law.  0 26 
2013 
South Africa signs an international treaty to clamp down on the illegal 
trade in cigarettes.  0 26 
2016 
Minister of Health announces plans to introduce legislation that would: 
introduce plain packaging and pictorial health warnings; make indoor 
public places 100% smoke free; ban vending machines; restrict point of 
sale marketing; regulate ENDS/ENNDS as tobacco products  0 26 
 
Source: Authors using The Tobacco Control Scale, 2010 (TCS), Joossens and Raw (2011). 
NB: The index does not have a scale for restriction of the sale of tobacco to minors (age limit raised from 
16 to 18 years as the policy is not included in Joossens and Raw (2011). 
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Table 2: Results of the estimated VECM 
 
 Variable Short-run Dynamic Long-run 2SLS  
                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Error correction 
term -0.152*** 
-
0.259** - - 
  
 
(0.058) (.098) 
    
log of cigarette 
prices -0.263** 
-
0.352** -0.722*** -0.548*** -0.523*** -0.589*** 
 (0.133) (0.165) (0.107) (0.097) (0.101) (0.084) 
log of real per capita 
gdp 0.226* 0.283** 0.394*** 0.487*** 0.123*** 0.052 
 (0.203) (0.217) (0.077) (0.052) (0.044) (0.040) 
policy index - -0.007 - - 0.016*** -0.011*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
changing market 
structure - 0.039 - -0.146*** -0.042 -0.062 
  (0.028)  (0.051) (0.046) (0.042) 
Constant 0.017*** 0.026 9.094 1.087 3.626*** 5.008*** 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.160) (1.029) (0.799) (0.696) 
VECM diagnostic 
tests 
   
  
  
Autocorrelation: LM 8.392 (0.495)   
 
  
  
Normality: Jarque-
Bera 
1.874 ( 
0.931)   
 
  
  
Stability: Eigenvalue 4 unit 
moduli           
 Durbin (score) 
chi2(1)  
   
  
 
18.479**
* 
 3.223* 
 Wu-Hausman 
F(1,50)          
24.625**
* 
3.05* 
 
Note: 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard error; ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Columns (1) and (3) are the restricted models for the short and long run VECM respectively 
Columns (2) and (4) are the unrestricted models 
Column (5) is the 2SLS model using real excise taxes as an instrument 
Column (6) is the 2SLS model using lag of prices as an instrument. 
 
 
 
  
14 
 
Figure 1: Real prices per pack and aggregate cigarette consumption, South Africa 1961-
2017  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: VECM stability test 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Plot for variables at levels and first difference 
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Figure 3: Plot for variables at levels 
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Figure 4: Plot for logged variables at first difference 
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Appendix 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable lags 
             Level First difference 
  ADF     PP   ADF       PP 
log(per capita consumption) 1 -1.698   -1.431  -4.474    -5.543   
log(real prices) 1 -1.232   -1.115  -3.587  -5.522  
log(real per capita gdp) 1 -3.127  -3.273   -4.175   -4.560   
 
NB: 5% critical values are: -3.496 and -3.497 for the ADF test at level and first difference respectively; whereas the PP test 
critical values are -3.495 and -3.496 at level and first difference respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Optimal VAR Lag Selection criteria 
 
lag LR Df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC  
0 
   
4.8e-06 -3.72732 -3.68417 -3.61475 
1 416.27* 9 0.00 2.3e-09* -11.3863* -11.2137* -10.936* 
2 15.039 9 0.09 2.4e-09 -11.3294 -11.0273 -10.5414 
3 7.2512  9 0.61 3.0e-09 -11.1227 -10.6911 -9.99696 
4 13.705 9 0.13 3.3e-09 -11.0401 -10.479 -9.57665 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Johansen-Juselius Maximum Likelihood Test for Cointegration 
 
Null Eigenvalue 
        Trace Statistics       Maximum eigenvalue 
 statistic  5% critical value statistic  95% critical value 
r=0 N/A  55.1446 29.68 47.6385  20.97 
r<1 0.57943  7.5061* 15.41 7.3605  14.07 
r<2 0.12526  0.1456  3.76 0.1456  3.76 
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Appendix 5: First Stage Estimates of 2SLS 
 
                                                  Excise taxes Lagged prices 
log of real excise taxes 0.384*** - 
 
(0.0368)  
log of lagged prices -- 1.0257*** 
 
 (0.0674) 
log of real per capita gdp 0.0224 0.0600* 
 
(0.0436) (0.0339) 
policy index 0.009*** .007* 
 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
changing market structure -0.0755* -.0411 
 
(0.0429) ( .0325) 
Constant -0.1506 -0.874 
 ( 0.7734) (0.5944) 
Number of obs 56 55 
F(   4,     51) 391.46 699.38 
R-squared 0.9685 0.9824 
Adj R-squared 0.9660 0.9810 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard error; ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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Appendix 6: Regression results using specific dummies 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
log of cigarette prices -0.447*** -0.447*** -0.566*** 
 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.076) 
log of real per capita gdp 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
changing market structure -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.211*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
Legislation 1 -0.224*** -0.224*** -0.174*** 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
Legislation 2 -0.465*** -0.465*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.084) 
Legislation 3 -0.486*** -0.486*** -0.322*** 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.108) 
Constant 2.908*** 2.908*** 4.089*** 
 
(0.760) (0.760) (0.730) 
Observations 56 56 55 
R-squared 0.970 0.970 0.973 
Durbin (score) chi2(1) 
 
9.587 (p =  0.002) 0.016 (p =  0.898) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,48)  
 
9.916  (p =  0.003) 0.014 (p =  0.907) 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard error; ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Note: 
Columns (1) is the long run VECM results using specific dummies 
Column (2) is the 2SLS model using real excise taxes as an instrument 
Column (3) is the 2SLS model using lag of prices as an instrument 
 
Specific dummies have been used for the existing tobacco legislation in South Africa. 
Tobacco Products Control Act, Act no. 83 of 1993 
Was amended by: 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act, no12 of 1999; 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act, no 23 of 2007 & 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act, no 63 of 2008. 
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Appendix 6: Tobacco Control Scale by Joossens and Raw (2011) 
 
No Tobacco Control Policy Scale 
1 Price of cigarettes and other tobacco products 30 
2 Smoke free work and other public places 22 
  Workplaces excluding cafes and restaurants - only one of 10 
  Complete ban without exceptions (no smoking rooms); enforced 10 
  
Complete ban, but with closed, ventilated, designated smoking rooms under very strict rules; 
enforced 8 
  Complete ban, but with ventilated, designated smoking rooms (not areas or places); enforced 6 
  Meaningful restrictions; enforced (75% of the workplace are smoke free) 4 
  Legislation, but not enforced 2 
  Cafes and restaurants - one only of 8 
  Complete ban; enforced 8 
  
Complete ban, but with closed, ventilated, designated smoking rooms (not areas or places); 
enforced 6 
  Meaningful restrictions; enforced (50% of bars and restaurants are smoke free) 4 
  Legislation, but not enforced 2 
  Public transport and other public places - additive 4 
  Complete ban in train without exceptions 1 
  Complete ban in other public transport without exceptions 1 
  Complete ban in educational, health, government and cultural places without exceptions OR  2 
  
Ban in educational, health, government and cultural places, but with designated smoking areas 
or rooms 1 
3 Spending on public information campaigns 15 
    4 Comprehensive bans on advertising and promotion 13 
  Points for each type of ban included - additive 1  
  Complete ban on tobacco advertising on television and radio 2 
  Complete ban on outdoor advertising (e.g posters) 2 
  Complete ban on advertising in print media (e.g newspapers and magazines) 1.5 
  &RPSOHWHEDQRQLQGLUHFWDGYHUWLVLQJHJFLJDUHWWHEUDQGHGFORWKVZDWFKHV« 1 
  Ban on display of tobacco products at the point of sales 2 
  Ban on point of sale advertising 1 
  Ban on cinema advertising 1 
  Ban on sponsorship 1 
  Ban on internet advertising 0.5 
5 Large direct health warning labels 10 
  
Plain packaging (the removal of trademarks, logos, colours and graphics, except for the 
government health warning and for the brand name, presented in a standardized typeface) in 
combination with pictorial health warnings in the front and the back of the tobacco product 
packages 4 
  Size of warning - one only of 3 
  50% or less of packet 1 
  51 - 79% of packet 2 
  80% or more of packet 3 
  Pictorial health warnings - additive 3 
  Pictorial health warnings on cigarette packs 2 
  Pictorial health warning on hand rolling tobacco 1 
6 Treatment to help dependent smokers stop 10 
  Recording of smoking status in medical notes 1 
  
Legal or financial incentive or record to record smoking status in all medical notes or patient 
files 1 
  Brief advice in primary care 1 
  Family doctors reimbursed for providing brief advice 1 
20 
 
  Quit line 2 
  National quit line or quit line in all major regions of country 1 
  Quit line counsellors answering at least 30 hours a week (not recorded) 1 
  Network of smoking cessation support and its reimbursement - one only of 4 
  Cessation support network covering whole country, free 4 
  Cessation support network but only in selected areas, eg major cities; free 3 
  Cessation support network covering whole country, partially or not free 3 
  Cessation support network but only in selected areas, eg major cities; partially or not free 2 
  Reimbursement of medications - one only of 2 
  Medications totally reimbursed or free to users OR 2 
  Medications partially reimbursed  1 
Source: Joossens and Raw (2011) 
